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CASES NOTED
The Court avoided the issue of the scope of the Executive's surveil-
lance power over foreign elements, leaving an ominous loophole-the
vague "significant connection" standard"7-which the Executive took
advantage of without hesitation. The Justice Department's failure to dis-
continue all but six of the acknowledged wiretaps was an exercise of the
kind of executive discretion the Court seemingly intended to curtail. The
citizen is hardly reassured "that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging
of law-abiding citizens cannot occur."38
JUAN P. LOUMIET
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS VS. PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS-THE DEATH OF THE
"FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT"
When respondents began to distribute anti-Vietnam War handbills
within the mall of petitioner's shopping center, uniformed security guards
threatened to arrest them for trespassing. The respondents left peace-
fully, but then sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to
establish their right to exercise the freedoms of speech and press and to
enjoin further interference from the petitioner. They argued that the
shopping center was the "functional equivalent" of public property, and,
therefore, the first and fourteenth amendments guaranteed their rights.1
The petitioner, Lloyd Corporation, contended that since the shopping
center was private property, it could enforce its strict and nondiscrimina-
tory no-handbilling rule under the protection of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 2 The federal district court of Oregon held for the respond-
ents and enjoined interference by the petitioner.' This decision was
37. Although we attempt no precise definition, we use the term "domestic organiza-
tion" in this opinion to mean a group or organization (whether formally or
informally constituted) composed of citizens of the United States and which has
no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies. No doubt
there are cases where it will be difficult to distinguish between "domestic" and
"foreign" unlawful activities directed against the Government of the United States
where there is collaboration in varying degrees between domestic groups or
organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But this is not such a case.
92 S. Ct. at 2133 n.8 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 2132. For an argument that electronic surveillance Ls per se unconstitutional
see Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,
118 U. Pa. L. REv. 169 (1969).
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." U.S. OONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States . . .without due process of law ...."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
3. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970).
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affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, in a five-four decision,
held, reversed: The owners of a privately owned shopping center may
nondiscriminatorily prohibit the distribution of handbills on their prop-
erty where the subject of the handbills is unrelated to the shopping cen-
ter's operations, and where there is a reasonably available public place
'for persons to effectively communicate their views. Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
The problem that faced the Court was primarily one of balancing
two distinct constitutional rights which had been drawn into conflict: the
social interest in freedom of expression, versus the social interest in
privately owned property. The right to freedom of expression on pub-
licly owned property is well established,5 and holds a preferred place in
our constitutional systeme as the cornerstone of our democratic way of
life.7 However, the existence of this right does not mean that individuals
have a constitutional right to propagandize their views whenever or
wherever they please.'
Conversely, the fifth amendment, applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, guarantees that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process and just compensation. A private
property owner's right to prevent trespassory invasions is also deeply
rooted in our common law,9 as is his right to preserve his property for a
lawful use.10
The respondents' principal argument was that the Lloyd Shopping
Center was the "functional equivalent" of the business district in Marsh
v. Alabama," as extended and applied in Amalgamated Food Employees
'Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.12 Consequently, they reasoned
that the shopping center should be treated as public property for first
amendment purposes, and that the property owner should be enjoined,
under the authority of Marsh and Logan Valley, from disturbing the ex-
ercise of their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.
Marsh involved a town which was entirely owned and operated by
a private company for its employees. It consisted of a residential section,
a business district, streets and sidewalks, and a sewage disposal plant. A
4. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
5. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Hague v. CIO., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Van
Nuys Publishing Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal. 3d 817, 489 P.2d 809, 97 Cal. Rptr.
777 (1971).
6. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
7. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
8. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Adderley]; Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Star v. Rookesby, 91 Eng. Rep. 295 (K.B. 1711).
10. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
11. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Marsh].
12. 391 U.S. 308 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Logan VaUeyl.
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member of the Jehovah Witnesses attempted to distribute religious litera-
ture in the business district, but was arrested and subsequently con-
victed under a state trespass statute. The conviction was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Black, in the majority opinion,
stressed the complete similarity of the town with any other town, as well
as the fact that the company had assumed all the customary functions of
a governmental municipality. He concluded that under these circum-
stances private property could be treated as public and held:
Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or posesses the
town the public in either case has an identical interest in the
functioning of the community in such manner that the channels
of communication remain free ... [and] the managers ap-
pointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of the press
and religion . ... .8
The broad language of Marsh moved the fulcrum so that the free-
doms of the first amendment were in a preferred position when balanced
against the rights of property owners, and it has subsequently provided
much momentum and authority for allowing picketing" and other first
amendment activities 5 on private property.
The respondents also relied on the Court's decision in Logan Valley.
They argued that the Court had extended the holding of Marsh to pro-
tect peaceful and nondisruptive first amendment activities within a pri-
vately owned shopping center. In Logan Valley, the owners of a shopping
center and a supermarket sought to enjoin a labor union from picketing
on their property. The union was attempting to inform patrons that the
employees of the market were nonunion, and in turn, to organize those
employees. However, in a footnote, the Court expressly limited its hold-
ing by authorizing picketing on shopping center property when it is
"directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center
13. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946).
14. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953); Schwartz-Torrance
Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965); People v. Barisi, 193 Misc. 934, 86 N.Y.S.2d 277
(Magis. Ct. 1948). Contra, People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 927 (1961), where the court recognized that certain language in Marsh would
appear to protect the right to use private property for speech, press and assembly, but then
held that the language must be read in the light of and limited to the facts in Marsh; Hood
v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964). For a short discussion of picketing on
private property, see Note, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.: The Right to Picket on a Privately Owned Shopping Center, 73 DxcK. L. Rav. 519
(1969).
15. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'g 308 F. Supp. 128 (D.
Ore. 1970); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968); Diamond v.
Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), where the court relied on
Marsh, Logan Valley, and the lower courts' reasoning in Lloyd; In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.
2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967); Blue Ridge Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Schleininger, 432 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. App. 1968); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center,
Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970).
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property was being put."' 6 Thus, the question presented in the instant
case had been left open.
Two factors have complicated Logan Valley's application. Although
the facts involved picketing, the majority consistently referred to "first
amendment rights," implying that first amendment rights other than
picketing could likewise be protected under these circumstances. Second,
the Court thoroughly discussed the analogies between the company town
in Marsh and the Logan Valley Shopping Center, and then concluded
that the shopping center was the "functional equivalent"' 7 of the business
district in Marsh. Since Logan Valley, this "functional equivalency"
principle has been interpreted by lower courts as being the determinative
test,'8 and they have almost uniformly protected such activity on private
property once they have found that the property is the "functional equiv-
alent" of the business district in Marsh.
The respondents in the present case adopted this interpretation.
They argued by analogy that the Lloyd Shopping Center was virtually
identical to the Logan Valley Mall and was even considerably larger.
They concluded that the Lloyd Shopping Center, like that in Logan
Valley, must be considered as the "functional equivalent" of a public
business district, and that their first amendment rights must therefore
be protected.
Keeping in mind the treatment of Logan Valley by the lower courts,
Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority in Lloyd, not only rejected
the offered analogy, but dismissed the "functional equivalency" test as
dictum that had been conceived in Marsh and that was "unnecessary to
the decision" in Logan Valley.' He went on to restate the holding of
Logan Valley as authorizing peaceful picketing on privately owned shop-
ping centers if: (1) the purpose of the picketing is directly related to the
shopping center's operations; and (2) the particular business being
picketed is in such a location that there is no other reasonable place for
the pickets to convey their message to their intended audience. 20
Justice Marshall's dissent took issue with this interpretation of
Marsh and Logan Valley.2' He maintained that the majority in Logan
Valley had relied heavily on Marsh and the concept of "functional
16. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 320 n.9 (1968).
17. Id. at 325.
18. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968); State v.
Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968); Blue Ridge Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Schleininger, 432 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. App. 1968), wherein Commissioner Maughmer admitted
that, had not Logan Valley dictated the result, he would have been inclined to enjoin the
handbilling in the shopping center; Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 3
Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970).
19. 92 S. Ct. at 2225.
20. Id. at 2226.
21. 92 S. Ct. at 2229 (dissenting opinion).
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equivalency." 2 However, in dissenting in Logan Valley, Justice Black
had suggested that the majority was misreading Marsh if it was using that
case as authority to create a "functional equivalency" test. He insisted
that Marsh specifically held that private property could be treated as
public only when it "has taken on all the attributes of a town"2 and
that the object of the picketing in Logan Valley, the shopping center, had
not met that test. His position lends credence to Justice Powell's analysis
of Marsh, since Justice Black had written the majority opinion in Marsh.
By disregarding the "functional equivalency" test, Justice Powell,
in effect, limited Logan Valley to its precise facts. He distinguished the
instant case by emphasizing that the handbilling did not have the neces-
sary relationship to the operations for which the center was built and
being used. He also pointed out that the respondents' message was not
directed solely to the patrons of Lloyd Shopping Center, and that they
could have adequately conveyed their views in nearby and readily ac-
cessible public places.24 With this alternative avenue of communication
available to the respondents, while presumably not present in Marsh
and Logan Valley, the Court weighted the scale in favor of the property
owner.
Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion recognized that the com-
position of the Court has changed radically in the four years since Logan
Valley. 5 This shift is significant in itself, and Lloyd could be the leading
indicator of a new direction of the Court when balancing competing con-
stitutional rights.
The supporters of the "Warren Court" have considered Marsh and
Logan Valley as correctly preferring the individual's first amendment
rights when they are in conflict with general property rights,26 and per-
haps these supporters will view Lloyd as a retreat which will weaken first
amendment rights. However, the majority in Lloyd could be suggesting
that the conflict is more precisely one between individual fifth amend-
ment guarantees and individual first amendment guarantees, even though
it recognized that there are times when the public interests must be pre-
ferred over property interests. But Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Logan
Valley reminded the Court that the Constitution recognizes and protects
an individual's property rights as well, and that if the Court wishes to
act as the government's agent to take or use an individual's property, it
must make reasonable compensation. 7
22. Id. As Mr. Justice Marshall was the author of the Court's opinion in Logan
Valley, his analysis is especially meaningful.
23. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 332 (1968) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
24. 92 S. Ct. at 2219.
25. Id. at 2229.
26. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
27. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
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Lloyd does not overrule Logan Valley, but the majority could be es-
tablishing the foundation for reconsideration of first amendment rights,
including picketing, when they are balanced against an individual's prop-
erty rights. The "Warren Court" was admittedly permissive when faced
with such an issue and generally legitimized any such protest as long as
it was orderly and without the threat of violence,28 even though the Court
recognized that first amendment rights may be regulated when their ex-
ercise unduly interferes with other members of the public.
Now it seems that the "Nixon Court" has begun to reemphasize an
individual's right to control his property, and it is clear from Lloyd that
the Court will subordinate that right only where: (1) the first amendment
activity is directly related to the use of the property; (2) the protestors
cannot effectively communicate their views on reasonably available public
property; and (3) the owner's prohibition of a particular form of first
amendment activity has been applied discriminatorily. The Lloyd Court
did not, however, clarify the question created by the Logan Valley Court
as to which activities would prevail over private property rights. Since the
Logan Valley case involved picketing, which historically has been given
less protection than other first amendment activities,"0 it seems that the
activities in Marsh, Logan Valley and Lloyd will be protected if they meet
the criteria established by the Lloyd Court. Conversely, it seems that none
may be protected if they do not.
This last conclusion is the most troublesome aspect of Lloyd in that
the decision may pose practical difficulties to persons wishing to express
their views in the modern community. For example, with the proliferation
of large suburban shopping centers and the consequent demise of the tra-
ditional town business districts, the shopping center may be the only cen-
tral location where differing views can be effectively communicated. How-
ever, if these views do not directly relate to the use of the shopping center,
Lloyd appears to prohibit their expression on that property.
The Lloyd Court found that there were adequate public places avail-
able for the protestors to distribute their literature, but in so finding, the
Court seemed to baptize the "cordon sanitaire of parking lots"'" which
normally surrounds large shopping centers and is generally used for such
expression. Perhaps this baptism was inadvertent since the majority relied
heavily on Marsh and on Justice Black's dissent in Logan Valley, which
28. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
29. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
30. E.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 35 U.S. 105 (1956) (union picketing in
employee parking lot of a manufacturing plant); Central Hardware v. NLRB, 407 U.S.
539, on remand, 468 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1972) (extended Babcock to cases where the lot
was open to the public).
31. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
325 (1968).
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stressed the concept that "good citizens . . . must be informed." 2 Hope-
fully, the courts will recognize the realities of today's suburban commu-
nities and allow such activity unless it is certain that there is a public area
which is reasonably accessible. If the courts fail to require this, the right
of expression will be severely restricted.
In the final analysis, these problems may be more imaginary than
real. If any one of the test factors are missing, there is no language in the
holding which should prevent courts from subordinating private property
rights to the first amendment rights which were involved in these cases.
In any event, and regardless of how the courts will treat these factors, the
Logan Valley "functional equivalency" test is dead.
JOHN R. DwYER, JR.
STANDING: A PUBLIC ACTION REQUIRES
A DIRECT PRIVATE WRONG
The defendant, United States Department of the Interior, was in
the planning stages of developing Mineral King Valley into an extensive
recreational ski resort. Plaintiff, Sierra Club, claiming a special interest
in the conservation and sound maintenance of the nation's national parks,
brought suit for a declaratory judgment and a preliminary and permanent
injunction restraining federal officials from approving the development.
Plaintiff relied upon section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act as
a basis for judicial review, claiming itself to be a "person aggrieved"
within the meaning of the Act.' Plaintiff did not allege that the threat-
ened action would affect the club or its members personally, but rather
maintained that its special interest in conservation was encompassed by
the Act and was an adequate basis for standing. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,2 hold-
ing that the plaintiff did not have standing because it failed to allege
any private wrong. The court also held that the plaintiff failed to show
an irreparable injury justifying a preliminary injunction. On writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held, affirmed: A
litigant has standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek
judicial review only if he can show that he has suffered or will suffer
injury, economic or otherwise. As the plaintiff in the instant case had
not alleged injury to itself or its members, it was without standing to
maintain the action. Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972).
32. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
2. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
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